Metropolitan National Sacco Declared Insolvent.

6 mins read
Metropolitan National Sacco Declared Insolvent.

Kenyaโ€™s Metropolitan National Sacco has been declared technically insolvent by Commissioner for Co-operatives David Obonyo, with an estimated Sh7 billion required for the institution to regain financial stability.

The insolvency means the Sacco cannot meet its financial obligations, including repaying members and fulfilling contractual commitments.

๐€ ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ ๐ ๐จ๐ฏ๐ž๐ซ๐ง๐ฆ๐ž๐ง๐ญ-๐จ๐ซ๐๐ž๐ซ๐ž๐ ๐ข๐ง๐ฏ๐ž๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐ ๐š๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐ฎ๐ง๐œ๐จ๐ฏ๐ž๐ซ๐ž๐ ๐ฆ๐š๐ฃ๐จ๐ซ ๐Ÿ๐ข๐ง๐š๐ง๐œ๐ข๐š๐ฅ ๐ข๐ซ๐ซ๐ž๐ ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐š๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐ž๐ฌ, ๐ข๐ง๐œ๐ฅ๐ฎ๐๐ข๐ง๐ :

Sh49 million in M-Pesa transactions by a single teller at the Nakuru branch.

Overstatement of the Sacco's premier loan facility by Sh7 billion due to suspected phantom members.

False dividend payments issued from member savings rather than surplus reserves.

Sh490 million in non-performing loans irregularly issued to employees.

Sh176.9 million unaccounted for across multiple branches.

Sh703 million in unexplained board expenditures from 2015 to 2022.

Despite the scale of the financial mismanagement, authorities are reluctant to wind up the Sacco, as this could hinder the recovery of members' funds and complicate legal action against those responsible.

Under Kenyaโ€™s Co-operative Societies Act, only the Saccoโ€™s board has the legal standing to sue or be sued on its behalf, posing a significant challenge to holding accountable those implicated in the financial mismanagement.

The Metropolitan Sacco crisis and recent KUSCCO's Sh13.3 billion scandal reveal systemic governance failures rooted in Kenya's 117-year cooperative legacy, where colonial-era structures designed for export crop control (coffee, dairy) never fully evolved with technology into member-centric institutions.

Historical analysis shows cooperative governance gaps emerged as early as 1931 when the first Co-operative Ordinance prioritized administrative control over financial oversight - a structural flaw amplified by post-independence rapid expansion under Sessional Paper No. 8 (1970) that prioritized quantity over governance quality.

While the Cooperative Bill 2024 proposes centralized oversight, the solution lies not in new laws alone but in dismantling the structural hypocrisy that lets cooperatives operate as shadow banks while avoiding equivalent scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Kenyaโ€™s capital markets landscape has been characterised by uncertainties and periods of turbulence, with several Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) listed firms grappling with financial distress.

Some NSE listed Firms, have in the recent past been subjected to insolvency procedures, either through liquidation or receivership.

This downturn has been fuelled by a combination of high debt burdens, foreign exchange fluctuations, operational inefficiencies, and weak corporate governance.

In 2023, for instance, the financial strain on non-financial NSE-listed companies became evident, with profits plunging by 58%. Rising input costs, shrinking consumer purchasing power, and supply chain disruptions created a challenging business environment.

Compounding these concerns, the Growth Enterprise Market Segment (GEMS), originally designed to attract small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), failed to gain traction, further dampening investor confidence in the capital markets.

In response, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) has rolled out a series of regulatory reforms aimed at stabilising the market and restoring investor confidence.

These measures include enhanced corporate governance requirements, stricter financial reporting standards, and clearer disclosure rules.

Among the most significant changes is the establishment of a Recovery Board, a dedicated segment within the NSE to support financially distressed firms in regaining stability.

Amendments to Rule 5.10.1 of the NSE Trading Rules.

At the cornerstone of these reforms introduced by the CMA is the amendment of the NSE Trading Rules, specifically Rule 5.10.1. The changes target speculative trading in struggling companies, fostering better governance, transparency, and investor protection.

A key provision is the creation of a Recovery Board within every market segment, including the Main Investment Market Segment (MIMS) and the SME segment.

Companies that experience severe financial and governance difficulties will be placed on this board, where they will have up to two years to implement recovery strategies. Failure to make sufficient progress within this period could result in delisting, subject to CMA approval.

To curb market speculation and price manipulation, the daily price fluctuation limit for stocks of distressed firms has been reduced from 10% to 5%. This measure is designed to prevent excessive volatility, which speculative traders can exploit. Additionally, stricter disclosure and compliance requirements have been imposed, ensuring that firms on the Recovery Board regularly update the market on their financial health and recovery progress.

The reforms also introduce stringent new eligibility criteria for companies seeking NSE listing. Firms must now demonstrate financial resilience, with a minimum paid-up capital of Kshs 50 million, assets exceeding Kshs 1 billion, and a senior management team with a solid governance track record. Furthermore, listed companies must show evidence of sustainable working capital and clear growth potential.

Implications for the banking sector

The changes introduced by the CMA are expected to have far-reaching effects on the countryโ€™s banking sector, particularly in risk management, lending practices, and investment strategies, as below:

Stricter lending policies.

The placement of firms on the Recovery Board signals heightened financial instability, making them riskier borrowers.

Banks that provide credit to NSE-listed firms in distress may now reassess their risk exposure, potentially demanding additional collateral, imposing stricter loan conditions, or even raising interest rates to compensate for the increased risk.

If a company fails to recover within the designated two-year period, banks may be forced to restructure loans or classify them as non-performing, increasing their default rates.

Additionally, under Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) regulations, banks are required to provision for bad loans when borrowers show signs of financial distress. With more companies expected to be placed on the Recovery Board, banks will likely have to set aside higher reserves to cover potential defaults. This could impact profitability, especially for institutions with high exposure to struggling sectors such as retail, manufacturing, or real estate.

Impact on investment portfolios.

Many banks invest in NSE-listed stocks as part of their treasury operations. However, the new 5% daily trading limit on distressed firmsโ€™ shares could create liquidity challenges, making it harder for banks to offload such investments.

In response, banks may shift their funds toward safer asset classes, such as government bonds, fixed-income securities, or blue-chip stocks. This move could reduce overall market participation by banks, potentially affecting stock market liquidity.

Moreover, banks that are themselves listed on the NSE will now face increased scrutiny under the enhanced corporate governance and disclosure requirements. They will be required to improve transparency in areas such as capital adequacy, non-performing loans, and risk-weighted assets.

While these measures are aimed at strengthening market confidence, they also introduce higher compliance costs. Banks will need to invest in better financial reporting systems, investor relations, and internal risk management frameworks to meet regulatory expectations.

Potential risks of delisting.

Perhaps the most significant risk posed by these new rules is the potential delisting of financially troubled banks. If a listed bank is placed on the Recovery Board due to financial distress, it could trigger panic among depositors, leading to liquidity pressures and possible capital flight.

Additionally, other banks may reduce interbank lending to the affected institution, exacerbating its liquidity challenges.

Should market confidence erode significantly, the CBK may need to intervene, either through regulatory oversight or emergency stabilisation measures.